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III. Civil Procedure
A. Discovery in Habeas Corpus Proceedings-Wilson v.
Weigel, 387 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1967); Wilson v.
Harris, 378 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1967).
In two recent cases' the Ninth Circuit has considered the extent
to which discovery procedures are available to habeas corpus peti-
tioners. Both cases were original actions brought by the warden of a
state prison for a writ in the nature of mandamus or prohibition to
prevent federal district courts from permitting the use of interroga-
tories and depositions in these two cases.
In the earlier of the two cases, Wilson v. Harris,2 the petitioner
claimed his conviction was unlawful since it was the result of a search
and seizure made without a warrant and without probable cause.
The question turned on the reasonableness of the arresting officer's
reliance on information given by an informer. In order to help estab-
lish his claim, the petitioner sought to have the state prison warden
answer interrogatories. The warden was asked whether the informant
had been instrumental in the conviction of other persons; and, if he
had been instrumental, the warden was asked to relate the facts
surrounding those convictions. The court in Harris held that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, under which the interrogatories had
been authorized by a federal district court, did not apply to habeas
corpus proceedings. Therefore, the interrogatories were improper and
the warden was not required to answer them.
About seven months later, in Wilson v. Weigel,3 the Ninth Circuit
was asked to overrule Harris.4 In Weigel, the petitioner claimed
that his detention was unlawful because the prosecutor had knowingly
used perjured testimony in obtaining the conviction. The petitioner
sought to take a deposition of a witness at his criminal trial. The
court refused to overrule Harris, but allowed the deposition on the
ground that the witness in Weigel was in a position to give evidence
in the habeas corpus proceedings, whereas the warden in Harris was
in a position to furnish only hearsay evidence which could not be
used as evidence in the habeas corpus proceeding. The Ninth Circuit
1 Wilson v. Weigel, 387 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1967); Wilson v. Harris, 378
F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1967).
2 378 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1967).
8 387 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1967).
4 Id. at 634.
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rested the Weigel decision upon a federal statute5 authorizing the use
of depositions for the taking of evidence to be used in habeas corpus
proceedings. The question before the court in these two cases was
twofold: is discovery available in federal habeas corpus proceedings;
and if so, to what extent.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as under most stat-
utes,6 discovery has been found to be a useful device "to narrow and
clarify the basic issues between the parties . .. [and to ascertain]
the facts, or information as to the existence or whereabouts of facts,
relative to those issues.' 7 Through Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, discovery extends to "any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending ac-
tion" whether or not the matter to which the discovery is directed
would be admissible in evidence. In order to use discovery it is
sufficient if the matter sought to be discovered "appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. ' 8 The term
"discovery," when used in this note, refers to the use of depositions and
interrogatories such as that previously described as being allowed
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 81(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that the federal rules apply to habeas corpus and naturalization pro-
ceedings, among others, "to the extent that the practice in such pro-
ceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United States. . . ."9 and
to the extent that the practice prior to the adoption of the federal
rules "conformed to the practice in civil actions."'1  The probable
intent of Congress in passing this Rule was to assure that those aspects
of procedure in the enumerated proceedings which had conformed to
the practice in civil actions prior to the adoption of the rules would
continue to conform to the practice in civil actions. Rule 81(a) (2) has
been held by some courts, in considering habeas corpus proceedings,
to mean that the federal rules apply only by analogy;" by other
courts, again in relation to habeas corpus proceedings, to mean that
5 28 U.S.C. § 2246.
0 At common law discovery was had through a bill in equity. Its pur-
pose was to provide the plaintiff in equity with the materials and information
necessary to make out his action or defense in a suit at law. It was limited to
acquiring information that he could introduce in evidence. Today, discovery
is generally provided for by statute and can be used for other purposes than
merely acquiring evidence. See generally Developments in the Law-Dis-
covery, 74 HARv. L. REV. 940 (1961).
7 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
8 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (b).
9 FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a) (2).
10 Id.
11 United States v. Harpole, 249 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1957); Albert v.
Patterson, 155 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1946).
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the federal rules apply unless a particular statute otherwise requires;12
and by a third group of courts, this time in connection with natural-
ization proceedings, to mean that in the absence of a controlling stat-
ute the federal rules apply where the procedure specified in the fed-
eral rules is in accord with the spirit of the action to which the rules
are sought to be applied.13 There is also a federal statute, 28 U.S.C.
section 2246, which provides that "[o]n application for a writ of
habeas corpus, evidence may be taken orally or by deposition, or, in
the discretion of the judge, by affadavit." There is a dearth of author-
ity as to the meaning of this statute. The cases that discuss it may be
divided into two groups: Those that say it authorizes discovery in
habeas corpus proceedings; 14 and those that say it specifically limits
discovery in habeas corpus proceedings to the acquisition of evi-
dence.15 Rule 81(a) (2) and section 2246 constitute the entire body of
statutory authority on which discovery in habeas corpus proceedings
is based, and were the basic material on which both Wilson v.
Harris'16 and Wilson v. Weigel' 7 were decided.
The first problem in relating Rule 81(a) (2) to habeas corpus pro-
ceedings is that it provides that the federal rules may be applied "to
the extent that the practice in [habeas corpus] proceedings is not
set forth in statutes of the United States."' 8  The question that is
immediately raised is whether section 2246 establishes the practice
for discovery in habeas corpus proceedings. In Harris, the Ninth Cir-
cuit said that the statute did not apply since the warden to whom the
interrogatories were submitted could only furnish hearsay evidence.
The statute provides that "evidence may be taken orally or by depo-
sition."'19 The court's refusal to apply section 2246 indicates that the
Ninth Circuit sees a limitation on the use of the statute: Evidence to
be taken by deposition must be such as would be admissible in a
court of law under the usual rules of evidence. The court in Harris
said, "the deposition ... authorized [by section 2246] may be
used only for the purpose of obtaining 'evidence', and not for general
discovery purposes."20  Notice that the court here uses the word
12 United States v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 53, 64 (5th Cir. 1962); Bowdidge
v. Lehman, 252 F.2d 366, 368 (6th Cir. 1958); Hunter v. Thomas, 173 F.2d 810
(10th Cir. 1949). Bailey, Federal Habeas Corpus-Old Writ New Role: An
Overhaul for State Criminal Justice, 45 B.U.L. REv. 161, 187 (1965).
13 See Yuen Jung v. Barber, 184 F.2d 491, 496 n.10 (9th Cir. 1950) (dic-
turn); In re Murra, 166 F.2d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 1948).
14 Knowles v. Gladden, 254 F. Supp. 643 (D. Ore. 1965).
15 Sullivan v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
16 378 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1967).
17 387 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1967).
18 FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a) (2).
19 28 U.S.C. § 2246.
20 Wilson v. Harris, 378 F.2d 141, 144 (9th Cir. 1967).
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"evidence" in its technical sense.21
In the later case of Wilson v. Weigel, with Judge Merrill writing
for the court, the Ninth Circuit cited section 2246 in allowing the
taking of a deposition from a person who had been a witness at the
petitioner's criminal trial. Judge Merrill distinguished the Harris
case on the basis that the warden in that proceeding was not in a
position to give "admissible evidence. ' 22  He also stated that "[i]f
it is proper to call [the deponent] as a witness, it is proper to take
her deposition." 23 In further distinguishing the Harris case, he said
that the interrogatories in that case had "no possible purpose of pre-
serving testimony. '24  It is almost impossible not to conclude that
section 2246, as construed by the Ninth Circuit, is limited in its appli-
cation to the procuring and preserving of only admissible evidence in
such cases.
This interpretation raises the question whether section 2246, so
construed, has any relationship to discovery. The only possible
argument that the statute does authorize discovery in habeas corpus
proceedings is derived from the fact that it provides for the use of
depositions and interrogatories. Since these are the two tools of dis-
covery, the statute, it is claimed, provides for discovery.25 The prob-
lem with this argument, however, is that it denies the possibility that
the use of depositions and interrogatories may be so restricted as to
destroy the element of discovery. In considering the uses of the
tools of discovery, it is apparent that there are two major areas of
utility: They may be used to explore the nature of the opponent's
case,26 which may be called the discovery function; and they may be
used to preserve evidence,27 which may be called the evidentiary
function. The discovery function is a result of the broad scope of the
questions which may be presented to the deponents 28 and implies an
inquiry into the unknown. The evidentiary function is the result of
the allowable uses to which the depositions and interrogatories may
be put at the time of trial29 and it implies a preservation of known
evidence. It is suggested that these are separate and independent
attributes of the tools of discovery.30 Section 2246, as construed
21 Id. at 144 n.5.
22 Wilson v. Weigel, 387 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1967) (emphasis added).
23 Id. (emphasis added).
24 Id. (emphasis added).
25 This was evidently a contention of the warden in Wilson v. Harris,
378 F.2d 141 (1967).
26 See Sunderland, Foreword to G. RAGLAND, JR., DiscovERY BEFoRE TRIAL,
at iii (1932).
27 G. RAGLAND, JR., DiscovERY BEFoRE TRIAL 19-20 (1932).
28 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (b).
29 FED. R. Crv. P. 26 (d).
30 See G. RAGLAND, JR., supra note 27, at 20.
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by the Ninth Circuit, limits the nature of the information which can
be sought in such cases to the procuring and preserving of admissible
evidence, and in doing so destroys the discovery function of the tools
of discovery.31 It leaves only the evidentiary function, which per-
tains to the method of procuring evidence for the trial. Section 2246,
therefore, relates to the conduct of the trial and not to the elucidation
of the information in habeas corpus proceedings and, as such, does
not preclude applying the federal rules relating to discovery to habeas
corpus proceedings, as was quite properly pointed out by the Ninth
Circuit in Harris.3 2
The foregoing construction of section 2246 raises the second prob-
lem regarding the application of Rule 81(a) (2) , in that this Rule pro-
vides first, that the procedure for discovery in habeas corpus must not
be prescribed by statute, and second, that, before the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure apply, the prior practice in habeas corpus proceed-
ings with regard to discovery must have conformed to the practice in
civil actions prior to the adoption of the federal rules.3 4 Judge Ham-
ley, writing for the court in Harris, literally applied the second re-
quirement and said that the federal rules could not be used without a
specific showing that the habeas corpus practice prior to the adoption
of the federal rules had conformed to the practice at law and in
equity.3 5 The court in Weigel was specifically asked to overrule Harris
on this point, but the court refused to do so.36 These decisions seem
to be unassailable so long as one accepts the proposition that Con-
gress, in enacting Rule 81(a) (2), was attempting to retain the status
quo at the time of the adoption of the rules.37 The problem with the
construction of this Rule which the court adopts in Harris and Weigel
is that there is little available evidence as to what the prior practice
in habeas corpus was.38 It is suggested that it would be more reason-
81 Wilson v. Harris, 378 F.2d 141, 144 (9th Cir. 1967); Sullivan v. United
States, 198 F. Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
32 Wilson v. Harris, 378 F.2d 141, 144 (9th Cir. 1967).
83 Had the Ninth Circuit felt that section 2246 was setting forth the prac-
tice for discovery in habeas corpus proceedings, it never would have had to
consider the second requirement of Rule 81(a) (2), since the statute would be
absolutely controlling. In both cases, however, the court discussed both
congressional enactments.
34 FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a) (2).
35 Wilson v. Harris, 378 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1967).
36 Wilson v. Weigel, 387 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1967).
37 The term "status quo" refers to the same relative practice; that is, if
there were no practice at the time of the adoption of the federal rules then
there would be no practice now after their adoption, and to the extent that
the practice before the adoption of the rules conformed to the practice at
law and in equity it would continue to conform, and to the extent the prac-
tices differed then they would continue to differ.
38 Note, Civil Discovery in Habeas Corpus, 67 CoLum. L. REv. 1296, 1301-04
(1967).
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able to say that Congress was attempting to apply the federal rules
to those situations in which they would compliment the nature of
the proceeding to which they were sought to be applied. It is interest-
ing to note that in another proceeding which comes under Rule 81 (a)
(2), a naturalization proceeding, the Ninth Circuit has recognized the
unreasonableness of the construction of section 2246 which it adopted
in Harris and Weigel.39 In the naturalization proceeding the Court
indicated by dictum that it thought a better construction of Rule
81(a) (2) would be that the federal rules apply where they are in accord
with the spirit of the action to which they are sought to be applied.40
An explanation for the refusal of the Ninth Circuit to apply the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to habeas corpus proceedings might
be that the court did not feel that it was within the spirit of habeas
corpus to allow broad discovery. It would not seem to be within the
spirit of any action to create conflict unnecessarily. Thus the court in
Weigel said:
Such a holding [allowing broad discovery] could completely destroy
finality of state court criminal judgments and render state proceedings
mere preliminaries to the unlimited factual exploration available for
the first time in federal habeas corpus.4 '
In reply to this argument, it is suggested that if the finality of state
39 The court indicated that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would
apply where they were in accord with the spirit of the action to which they
were sought to be applied. Yuen Jung v. Barber, 184 F.2d 491, 496 n.10 (9th
Cir. 1950). To reach that position the court, by dicta, disapproved the prior
case of Wixman v. United States, 167 F.2d 808, 810 n.4 (9th Cir. 1948), where
the court had held, by implication, that the federal rules did not apply to a
naturalization proceeding without a showing that the prior practice in
naturalization proceedings conformed to the practice in civil actions. It also
expressed approval of In re Murra, 166 F.2d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 1948), which ap-
plied the federal rules in the same circumstances as the Wixman case be-
cause there was no statute requiring that they not be applied and because
the federal rule in question complimented the action to which it was sought
to be applied. But cf. Ruby v. United States, 341 F.2d 585, 587 (9th Cir. 1965),
where the court in discussing how broadly to interpret a habeas corpus peti-
tion said, "[tihe ordinary rules of civil procedure are not intended to apply
[to habeas corpus], at least in the initial, emergency attention given . . . to
the application for the writ." This case may, however, be reconcilable with
the view that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should apply where
they compliment the spirit of the habeas corpus action. The court seems to
say that to interpret the petition broadly would be inconsistent with the
nature of habeas corpus. If that was the reason for refusing to interpret the
petition broadly, then this reason is clearly consistent with the proposition
that the federal rules apply where they compliment the nature of the pro-
ceeding to which they are sought to be applied. A strict reading of the
language would, however, preclude the application of the federal rules to
habeas corpus.
40 Yuen Jung v. Barber, 184 F.2d 491, 496 n.10 (9th Cir. 1950).
41 Wilson v. Weigel, 387 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1967) (footnotes omitted).
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court criminal judgments were destroyed, such destruction would not
stem from the mere allowance of broad discovery, but rather, would
result from the very nature of habeas corpus relief itself. In the first
place, the "unlimited factual exploration 42 feared by the Weigel Court
must be restricted to an inquiry into the lawfulness of the detention,
43
as discovery cannot extend the scope of the proceeding in which it is
employed.44  In the second place, the federal court need hold an
evidentiary hearing only where it appears that the hearing in the trial
court was inadquate. 45 Discovery will affect the need for a hearing
only to the extent it aids in showing that the evidentiary proceeding in
the trial court was inadequate. Allowance of broad discovery would
place the question of whether a new evidentiary proceeding is neces-
sary clearly before the federal judge so that he could make a knowl-
edgeable determination. Also, discovery would allow a speedier 4 6 and
more accurate determination of the issues relating to the lawfulness
of the detention, matters on which the federal court must pass in
any event. It is thus difficult to see how broad discovery would in
any way increase the tendency to make "state proceedings mere pre-
liminaries" 47 to the federal action.
Another possible explanation for the Harris and Weigel decisions,
and a possible reason why the court would not consider broad dis-
covery to be within the spirit of habeas corpus, is that the court
feared that its work load would be increased thereby, and that the
detrimental effect of this result would exceed the benefits that would
be derived from allowing broad discovery. Some support for this
concern is found in the fact that from 50 to 90 percent of all habeas
corpus petitions are frivolous.48 Many petitioners are motivated by
boredom or a desire to obstruct the judicial machinery.49 If these
persons could also avail themselves of broad discovery machinery,
the results could be catastrophic. Not only would the courts be busy
42 Id.
43 R. SOKOL, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS § 1 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as SOKOL].
44 "[T]he deponent may be examined [only] regarding any matter ...
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action ..
FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (b).
45 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1965); Townsend
v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1962).
46 Discovery would allow a speedier determination of the issues by
clarifying the alleged grounds and facts on which habeas corpus is to be
granted and possibly by finding a valid ground not originally alleged which
would prevent the necessity for a second hearing.
47Wilson v. Weigel, 387 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1967).
48 Note, The Burden of Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions From State
Prisoners, 52 VA. L. REv. 486, 496 (1966).
49 Id. at 490, 496.
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determining whether or not to allow discovery through inter-
rogatories, the prosecutors would be kept busy answering them, as
would jailors, witnesses and anyone else who might possibly have
information "[leading] to the discovery of admissible evidence."50
In considering the merit of this explanation, it is helpful to con-
sider an example. Suppose a prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus. The federal court would receive the petition and assign it to
a judge who would determine whether the jurisdictional requirements
had been met and whether the prisoner had stated sufficient grounds
on which the relief sought could be granted. The judge would
then have three possible courses of action: He could summarily
dismiss the petition; or he could grant the writ; or he could is-
sue an order requiring the person detaining the petitioner, probably
a warden, to show cause why the writ should not be granted.51 Judg-
ing from past experience, about 60 to 100 percent of the petitions
would be summarily dismissed at this point.52 . At least to this point,
broad discovery would not be available as a matter of right. If the
petitioner sought to issue interrogatories within 10 days of the filing
of his petition, or to serve a notice'of the taking of a deposition within
20 days of the filing of his petition, he would need the permission of
the court.53 Since the first' screening of the petitions would prob-
ably be completed within a few days after the filing of a petition,
neither interrogatories nor depositions would become available to the
petitioner as a matter of right, and therefore would not increase the
normal burden on the courts at this point.
Assuming that he did not summarily dismiss the petition, the
judge would probably issue an order to show cause why 'the writ
should not be granted.54 The person to whom the order was directed
would then have three days to answer unless, for good cause, an
extension of up to 20 days were allowed.5 5 On the return of an
answer, the judge again would have three choices: He could deny
the petition on the basis of the warden's return where only issues of
law were involved;56 he could grant the writ; or he could order an
50 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (b).
51 SOKOL, supra note 43, § 11; Bailey, Federal Habeas Corpus-Old Writ,
New Role: An Overhaul for State Criminal Justice, 45 B.U.L. REV. 161, 184
(1965); Note, The Burden of Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions From State
Prisoners, 52 VA. L. REV. 486, 493 (1966).
52 Note, The Burden of Federal. Habeas Corpus Petitions From State
Prisoners, 52 VA. L. REv. 486, 493 (1966).
53 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a), 33.
54 Bailey, supra note 51.
55 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1964).
56 Note, The Burden of Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions From State
Prisoners, 52 VA. L. REV. 486, 493-94 (1966); see 28 U.S.C. § 2248 (1964); R.
SoKoL, supra note 43, § 12; Bailey, supra note 51 at 185.
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evidentiary hearing.57 Both the petition and the answer could be
buttressed with depositions and affidavits stating evidence on which
the judge could make his decision.58 If the statements made in the
answer were not contested, they would be assumed to be true
and there would be no issue of fact so that the judge could decide
the issue without an evidentiary hearing.59
It is likely that the answer by the warden would be returned be-
fore discovery became available as a matter of right.60  Fear that a
prisoner could be able to make use of the discovery machinery might
encourage the warden to make a quick return of evidence in his
possession which would disclose any lack of merit in the petition,
61
thereby helping to point out frivolous petitions so that those petitions
could be summarily dismissed. It is safe to assume that after the
second screening, which could be completed by the time discovery
was available to the petitioner as a matter of right, most of the
frivolous petitions would have been eliminated. After the frivolous
petitions had been weeded out, it would seem desirable to permit the
broadest possible inquiry into the case, covering all grounds for grant-
ing habeas corpus. Should the judge decide that an evidentiary hear-
ing were necessary he would be required to hold the hearing within
five days of the return unless, for good cause, more time were al-
lowed.61  After a full and complete hearing all possible issues of
fact should be settled and the findings put in the record so that any
future petitions by the same petitioner based on those facts could be
summarily dismissed,6 thereby reducing the time needed to dispose
of a later petition.64 It is suggested that the increased burden, if
any, that would be imposed upon the courts because of allowing
broad discovery would be related primarily to claims that were not
frivolous, and therefore should not constitute a particularly onerous
57 Note, The Burden of Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions From State
Prisoners, 52 VA. L. REv. 486, 493-94; see Bailey, supra note 51, at 185.
58 R. SOKOL, supra note 43, § 12; Bailey, supra note 51, at 189.
59 28 U.S.C. § 2248 (1964); Bailey, supra note 51, at 185-86.
60 See text accompanying note 53 supra. The 10 day period is particu-
larly applicable here because the warden is a party in the habeas corpus
proceeding and interrogatories can be addressd to him.
61 See R. SOKOL, supra note 43, § 12, on the desirability of encouraging
complete answers by wardens to orders to show cause.
62 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1964).
63 "[A]fter an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual
issue, or . . . of an issue of law, . . . a subsequent application for a writ of
habeas corpus ... need not be entertained... unless the application alleges
and is predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the hearing
of the earlier application .... " 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1964), as amended,
(Supp. II, 1965).
64 Carter, Pre-trial Suggestions for § 2255 Cases, 32 F.R.D. 391 (1963).
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burden.65
It has been shown that existing federal procedures relating to the
use of discovery in federal courts can be used to prevent an abuse of
the discovery machinery in habeas corpus proceedings.6 It has also
been shown that the use of discovery could possibly speed up the
already rapid disposition of petitions for habeas corpus. 7 The speed
with which these petitions could be handled would seem nearly to
eliminate any problem caused by frivolous petitions, but how would
it affect meritorious claims? It is not at all inconceivable that the
entire disposition of a claim could be completed before discovery be-
came available as a matter of right.0 8 At least it is probable that
discovery would not become available as a matter of right at a time
much before the time the warden made his return and the judge was
called upon to decide whether an evidentiary hearing was ncessary.69
A short period during which discovery would be available, how-
ever, might well limit the effectiveness with which it could be used.
Suppose that the warden were able to get the maximum amount of
time allowed by statute in which he was required to make his return,
23 days.70 The prisoner would then be able to take depositions for
only the last three days, or issue interrogatories for only the last 13
days. By the time the person to whom discovery was directed had
responded, 71 the petitioner would have had very little opportunity
to make effective use of any beneficial information which he had
acquired in order to convince the judge either to grant the writ or to
order an evidentiary hearing. It is apparent that the effectiveness, as
well as the ability to make use, of discovery might be made to depend
on the efficiency of the judge and the warden in handling petitions.
It seems that the speed with which a hearing can be conducted when
coupled with the inherent delays72 involved in the use of discovery
could almost destroy the utility of discovery to a person who needs
it. Of course, the petitioner would not be absolutely precluded from
using discovery during the period before it became available as a
matter of right. He would only need to have the permission of the
65 See Note, The Burden of Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions From
Prisoners, 52 VA. L. Rav. 486, 495-97 (1966).
66 See text accompanying notes 53, 60 supra.
67 See text accompanying note 61 supra.
68 See text accompanying notes 60-62 supra.
69 See text accompanying note 60 supra.
70 See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1964).
71 Under FED. R. Civ. P. 33 the person on whom interrogatories are served
normally has 15 days in which to answer. The time allowed for answering
depositions is provided for in FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (a) for oral examination and
in FED. R. Civ. P. 31 (a) for written interrogatories.
72 See text accompanying note 53 supra.
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court to use it.7 Therefore, in most cases,74 the usefulness of dis-
covery to the prisoner would depend upon the wise exercise of dis-
cretion by the judge in allowing discovery before it became available
as a matter of right.
Notwithstanding the rules, federal courts have the inherent power
to allow discovery in meritorious cases.75 The question may then
be asked whether the courts should apply the rules relating to dis-
covery. The answer is that the federal courts have been noticeably
reticent to exercise their inherent power.76 Applying the federal
rules might well provide the impetus necessary to persuade federal
courts to "imaginatively handle"77 petitions for writs of habeas corpus,
and thereby avoid the necessity of giving lengthy consideration to
successive motions by the same prisoner.78
In conclusion, it is instructive to consider how the application of
the federal rules might have affected the Harris and Weigel cases.
Weigel would have arrived at the same result, since the court
allowed the deposition, but Harris probably would have arrived at a
different result. In Harris the district court judge allowed discovery
based on the federal rules and was reversed because the Ninth Circuit
held that the federal rules did not apply. Under the proposed change,
the decision of whether or not to grant discovery would, in effect,
ultimately rest with the trial judge since there would be no reversal
of his decision without a showing that he had abused his discretion.
That result must be contrasted with the situation in Harris where the
trial judge was reversed because the ground-the application of the
Federal Rules-on which he had allowed discovery was found to be
nonexistent. To apply the federal rules would cause a change only of
emphasis toward encouraging the use of discovery, but a change that
would have practical consequences of benefit to both the court and the
prisoner.
J.D.E.
73 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (a), 33.
74 It is still possible that after the warden had made his answer, the
judge would determine that there was good cause for postponing a hearing
beyond the five days provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 2243 so that a prisoner could
make effective use of discovery.
75 Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 228, 231 (1964).
76 Id. at 240.
77 As Justice Brennan pointed out, "the imaginative handling of a peti-
tioner's first motion would in general do much to anticipate and avoid the
problem of a hearing on a second or successive motion .... [T]o the extent
the files and records 'conclusively show' that the prisoner is entitled to no
relief on any such grounds [as alleged in the second petition], no hearing on
a second or successive motion, to. the. extent of such grounds, would be
necessary." Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 2-23 (1962).
78 Carter, Pre-Trial Suggestions for § 2255 Cases, 32 F.R.D. 391 (1963).
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B. Relief from Fraudulent Deprivation of the Right
to Appeal-Rodriguez v. United States,
387 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1967).
Present federal law has made appeal from a United States
district court's judgment of criminal conviction a matter of right. A
person convicted in a United States district court has a right to have
the court of appeals review his conviction without petitioning that
court to exercise its discretion to permit the case to be brought before
it on appeal.' One of the requisites to the exercise of this right is the
necessity of filing notice of appeal within 10 days after entry of judg-
ment.2 The inquiry of this note, however, concerns the problem of
review of the criminal conviction after the expiration of this 10-day
time allotment. More precisely, the questions to be answered are what
is and, further, what should be the remedy of a person convicted in a
federal court who has not filed notice of appeal within the 10 days
allowed because of the alleged deceit and fraud of his counsel.3
Relief, in the situation where the 10-day limit has passed, is
usually sought under 28 U.S.C. section 2255, the purpose of which is to
provide "an expeditious remedy for correcting erroneous sentences
without resort to habeas corpus." 4 Where a defendant has charged
that he has been defrauded of his right to appeal by his counsel, he
endeavors to qualify under section 22555 by asserting violations of his
constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel0 and due process
of law.7
1 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 441-42(1962).
2 FED. R. App. P. 4 (b). All the cases discussed throughout this note were
decided under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 37, which has since been
abrogated and superseded by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce'-
dure.
3 Rule 37(a) (2) (superseded by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure containing the same provision) contained a provision which allowed
the court at its discretion to extend the 10-day time period for appeal, for
reason of excusable neglect, by a period not to exceed 30 days.
It could be argued that an appellant may qualify for relief under this
provision if he discovers his attorney's fraud within that 30 day period. See
Buckley v. United States, 382 F.2d 611 (10th Cir. 1967); Carrell v. United
States, 335 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1964). It may be difficult to succeed under this
argument, however, because the courts might hold that a client is bound by
his counsel's inaction. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 634, 634 n.10
(1961).
4 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Legislative History (1964).
5 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964).
6 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
7 "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Rodriquez v. United States8 is one of the latest Ninth Circuit
cases dealing with the situation wherein relief is sought under section
2255. Rodriquez was sentenced to serve 20 years in the custody of the
Attorney General of the United States for violation of the Federal
Narcotics Law. His sentence was handed down on June 20, 1963, and
on February 15, 1966, he filed a motion to vacate his sentence under
section 2255. His requested relief under this section-that his con-
viction be set aside and that he be restored to the status of a defendant
at sentencing having 10 days within which to file a notice of appeal-
was based upon the charge that he had been defrauded of his right
to appeal by his counsel. The appellant alleged that his counsel failed
to file written notice of appeal within the time limit imposed, after
having promised to do so. The petitioner alleged further that this
failure was the result of intentional inaction on the part of his counsel
and was committed with the full knowledge that the petitioner was
then illiterate and unable to file timely notice of appeal unless
he had professional assistance. This petition was denied by the
district court without a hearing and the petitioner filed, pro se and in
forma pauperis, a timely appeal."
In a per curiam opinion, the Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed
the district court's denial of relief, quoting from the district court's
opinion:
The foregoing statement is petitioner's sole ground for relief. He
does not assert that the failure to appeal resulted in a loss of a basic
right, constitutional or otherwise, for which loss he is entitled to a
remedy under § 2255. Petitioner has not, beyond the above conclusory
statement, disclosed to this Court the nature of the error and prejudice
which he proposes by appeal to correct. Consequently, there is no way
in which this Court can determine the existence of prejudice or judge
the substantiality of petitioner's claim.' 0
The court of appeals, without further comment, then cited as its
authority for affirmance McGarry v. Fogliani," Miller v. United
States,12 and Wilson v. United States.13
The important point to note is that in this opinion the Ninth
Circuit affirms the position that where fraud is charged in depri-
vation of the petitioner's right to appeal, there is still a requirement
that the petitioner allege error in the trial which would be grounds
for reversal if proved on appeal. The three authorities cited by the
court were addressed to the substantiation of this point and, there-
fore, require examination as to their bases for support of this propo-
sition.
8 387 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1967).
9 Id.
10 Id. at 118.
11 370 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1966).
12 339 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1964).
's 338 F.2d 54 (9th Cir. 1963).
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The following analysis examines the three cases relied on in
Rodriquez, and in turn, the cases which those three cases used as
authority. The purpose of this discussion is to determine the basis of
the position enunciated by the Ninth Circuit. As will be seen, every
Ninth Circuit case which, in fact, holds that reversible error must be
shown for relief to be granted under section 2255 is traceable to the
Ninth Circuit decision in Dodd v. United States.14
In McGarry v. Fogliani,15 which concerned a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, the petitioner claimed that his retained counsel failed to per-
fect an appeal from his conviction (there was no allegation of fraud),
and the Ninth Circuit held that, standing alone, this was not a ground
for federal habeas corpus relief. The court continued, saying: "He
makes no showing whatever that any prejudicial errors occurred that
would have called for a reversal of his conviction."1 6 The court cited'
7
as authority for its holding Watkins v. United States,18 Thomas v.
United States,19 Miller v. United States20 and Dodd v. United States.21
An examination of the Thomas decision shows that the Ninth
Circuit here considered the case on asserted errors occurring at the
trial and specifically refused to decide the question raised in Dodd,
where it was held that if the petitioner could sustain both allegations
of involuntary forfeiture of right to appeal and reversible error in the
original trial, he would be entitled to relief under section 2255.22
Thomas, by its own admission, then, does not support the McGarry
holding.
More significant than Thomas is Watkins, where the Ninth Circuit
denied relief under section 2255, quoting Dodd that "'a failure of
counsel to file notice of appeal will only justify relief under section
2255 where there is also a showing of plain reversible error in the
trial.' "J23
Miller was a case which was cited as authority in both Rodriquez
and its cited authority, McGarry. The petitioner there charged that,
notwithstanding his unsolicited promise to do so, court appointed
counsel did not honor his assurance to file timely notice of appeal.
The Ninth Circuit again denied relief under section 2255, holding that
for relief to be granted plain reversible error must be alleged, and
14 321 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1963).
15 370 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1966).
16 Id. at 44.
17 Id.
18 356 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1966).
19 343 F.2d 49 (9th Cir. 1965).
20 339 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1964).
21 321 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1963).
22 Thomas v. United States, 343 F.2d 49, 55 (9th Cir. 1965).
23 Watkins v. United States, 356 F.2d 472, 473 (9th Cir. 1966).
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that none was in fact alleged.24  The only authority cited for this
position 25 was Wilson.
In Wilson, the court denied relief under section 2255 on the basis
of its interpretation of Dodd that "allegations of error and of matters
occurring on trial which, if proved, might be deemed a denial of basic
rights" '26 must be charged by the petitioner.
The above analysis of Rodriquez and of all its derivative author-
ities points to two conclusions: first, that case law in the Ninth
Circuit firmly adheres to the rule that in order for relief to be granted
under section 2255 the petitioner must allege both the involuntary
deprivation of his right to appeal by his counsel and the plain rever-
sible errors which he hopes to correct on appeal; and second, that all
ease law underlying Rodriquez is reducible to the common denomi-
rator of Dodd. Since it is in Dodd that Rodriquez and its authorities
search for their justification, a close examination of that decision is
in order.
Dodd v. United States was a case in which the Ninth Circuit
endeavored to catalogue the pertinent cases concerning relief under
section 2255, and then set out a standard to be used by the district
courts in granting relief under it. Dodd was a prisoner in federal
custody asking for vacation of his conviction. In his petition for
relief under section 2255, he made numerous allegations of error
committed both by the court during trial and by his counsel in addi-:
tion to the charge that his counsel failed to file timely notice of
appeal after being instructed to do So. 2 7 The court, after listing cases
which it felt were dispositive of the issue, generalized from them the
following principles:
(1) failure to appeal may not be excused by a mere showing of
neglect of counsel;(2) relief will be denied where there was a knowing or calcu-
lated decision not to appeal;(3) in any event there would have to be the additional showing
of "plain reversible error at the trial" in order for relief to be
granted. 28
The court then remanded the case and directed that a hearing be
held where it should be determined whether the petitioner had in-
tentionally relinquished his right to appeal, and, if there had been no
such intentional relinquishment, then to find whether the petitioner
had suffered any prejudice in not obtaining an appeal.29
The court advanced two grounds in support of its enunciated
24 Miller v. United States, 339 F.2d 581, 582 (9th Cir. 1964).
25 Id.
26 Wilson v. United States, 338 F.2d 54, 55 (9th Cir. 1964).
27 Dodd v. United States, 321 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1963).
28 Id. at 243-44 (emphasis by the court).
29 Id. at 246.
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rule that a "failure of counsel to file notice of appeal will only justify
relief under section 2255, where there is also a showing of 'plain re-
versible error in the trial'-":30 One was legal precedent,31 and the
other was "logic.
'32
A brief examination of the cases cited by the Dodd court as
precedent 33 will readily show that they, in fact, lend no support to the
rule laid down by the court. In both Glouser v. United States34 and
Mitchell v. United States3 5 the circuit courts involved specifically de-
clined to decide the question whether collateral attack of a conviction
would be possible under section 2255 if the reason for failure to appeal
were accompanied by allegations of plain reversible error at the trial.
Instead, the cases were decided on the merits of the errors alleged in
the respective petitions for relief. It should be noted that when the
District of Columbia Circuit, which decided Mitchell, considered this
question in Dillane v. United States36 it decided contrary to Dodd.3 7
Lastly, in United States v. Peabody,"8 a Washington district court
laid down the proposition that an additional "showing must be made
that there was 'plain reversible error in the trial.' "19 The court,
however, cited as its only authority for this rule Mitchell, which, as
shown above, refused to decide that very question.
The remaining support for the Dodd decision was stated to be
"logic."40 The Ninth Circuit failed to explain how logic supported its
holding, but on analysis, "logic" supports the holding of the case in
no better fashion than the legal precedent cited by the court. A
defendant who seeks immediate direct review of his case by appeal
from a conviction in a federal district court need make no showing
of any error whatever. 41 His appeal is a matter of right,42 and is
contingent upon the meeting of only a few procedural requirements.
43
30 Id. at 245.
31 Id. at 245, citing Glouser v. United States, 296 F.2d 853 (8th Cir.
1961), Mitchell v. United States, 254 F.2d 954 (D.C. Cir. 1958), and United States
v. Peabody, 173 F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Wash. 1958).
32 321 F.2d at 245.
33 Id. at 245, citing Glouser v. United States, 296 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1961),
Mitchell v. United States, 254 F.2d 954 (D.C. Cir. 1958), and United States v.
Peabody, 173 F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Wash. 1958).
84 296 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1961).
35 254 F.2d 954, 954-55 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
80 350 F.2d 733 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
37 See text accompanying notes 65-68 infra.
38 173 F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Wash. 1958).
39 Id. at 415.
40 Dodd v. United States, 321 F.2d 240, 245 (9th Cir. 1963).
41 FED. R. Crm. P. 32; FED. R. App. P. 4.
42 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 441 (1962).
43 FED. R. Cam. P. 32; FED. R. App. P. 4.
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Logic is nonexistent in the proposition which places the defendant
in the much more compromised position of having to show rever-
sible error in order to obtain the right to appeal when he was de-
frauded of the right by an officer of the court. The fraudulent
deprivation of this right of the defendant by an officer of the court is
prejudicial of the defendant's rights per se. Because he is the victim
of this deceit, he should not be placed in an even more disadvantaged
position.
Logic appears to demand a conclusion contrary to the holding in
Dodd;44 and precedent, as cited in Dodd, when analyzed, does not lend
support to the position which that case takes. Rodriquez then would
seem to stand on an unsecure foundation.
The problem posed by Rodriquez has received considerable atten-
tion in the other circuits. It appears that there is a general recog-
nition that some remedy, not nearly as compromising as that provided
in Dodd, must be provided the defrauded petitioner in obtaining re-
view of his case under section 2255.
The First Circuit, in Desmond v. United States,45 has taken a
tentative step in the direction of permitting an avenue of redress for
the defrauded petitioner. The court analogized to Ellis v. United
States48 and Coppedge v. United States, 47 where it was held that in
forma pauperis appeals must be allowed unless the issues raised are so
plainly frivolous that the appeal would be dismissed in the case of a
non-indigent litigant. By this analogy, the First Circuit held that
the appellant, to obtain relief under section 2255, does not need to
show plain reversible error in his trial, "but that the shoe is on the
other foot and that to defeat relief the Government must show that
appellate relief would be futile. '48
The Tenth Circuit has had an interesting development in this
area. The circuit court held that under the old Rule 37(a) (2)
"[t] he time for fixing an appeal ... does not commence to run until
the defendant has been advised of his right to appeal and the effective
assistance of counsel has been afforded."49 Therefore, the court al-
lowed an appellant to make a late appeal and thereby directly attack
his conviction where he charged, for example, that his attorney failed
to advise him of his right to appeal.50 This rule was extended to
44 Dillane v. United States, 350 F.2d 732, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Caland v.
United States, 323 F.2d 405, 408 (7th Cir. 1963); see Fallen v. United States,
378 U.S. 139 (1964); Fennell v. United States, 339 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1965).
45 333 F.2d 378 (1st Cir. 1964).
46 356 U.S. 674 (1958).
47 369 U.S. 438 (1962).
48 Desmond v. United States, 333 F.2d 378, 381 (1st Cir. 1964).
49 Hannigan v. United States, 341 F.2d 587, 588 (10th Cir. 1965).
50 Id.
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state prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief.51 A different
rule, however, seems to have developed in the Tenth Circuit where
the petitioner seeks relief under section 2255. In such a case the
circuit court appears to require the petitioner to allege either that
he had been fraudulently deprived of his right to appeal, or, if no
fraud is charged, that he had suffered reversible error in the trial.52
The Seventh Circuit took a different approach to the case where
the convicted defendant claimed that he had been defrauded of his
right to appeal. The circuit court, in Cafland v. United States,53
exercised what it claimed was a federal court's inherent power to
investigate whether a judgment was procured by fraud, and
"[a]ccordingly, a federal court may bring before it by appropriate
means all those who may be affected by the outcome of its investi-
gation .... .54 The majority in Calland recognized Dodd as author-
ity but said that Dodd was not contrary to the holding in Calland on
the ground that Dodd did not apply to the situation in which fraud
was claimed.55 The dissent felt that Dodd was applicable to a case
where fraud was charged. 56 A close reading of the general language
of Dodd that "in any event there would have to be the additional
showing of 'plain reversible error at the trial' in order for relief to be
granted" 57 belies the distinction made by the majority and supports
the minority contention.5
The Fifth Circuit has approached this problem directly and pro-
vides an equitable method of redress for the defrauded defendant.
LyZes v. United States"0 is the case which articulates the basic position
taken by the Fifth Circuit on the issue of fraud on the part of counsel.
The court provided that there should be a hearing in the district court
concerning the petitioner's allegations of frustration of his right to
appeal. If it were found that his charges were true, he was then
permitted to attack in that district court its judgment as if on direct
appeal.6 0 The court provided further that the petitioner would be
entitled to assistance of counsel in presenting both the preliminary
question concerning his original failure to appeal and the ultimate
51 Wynn v. Page, 369 F.2d 930 (10th Cir. 1966); Chase v. Page, 343 F.2d
167 (10th Cir. 1965).
52 See Fennell v. United States, 339 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1965).
53 323 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1963).
54 Id. at 408, quoting Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Refining Co.,
328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946).
55 Calland v. United States, 323 F.2d 405, 408 (7th Cir. 1963).
56 Id. at 409.
57 Dodd v. United States, 321 F.2d 240, 243-44 (9th Cir. 1963).
58 See text accompanying notes 25-30 supra.
59 346 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1965).
60 Id. at 792; accord, Brewen v. United States, 375 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1967);
Bray v. United States, 370 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1966).
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direct attack on his original conviction.61
The Fifth Circuit has extended relief to state prisoners seeking
federal habeas corpus relief,6 2 as has been done in the Tenth Circuit. 3
In addition to the relief under section 2255 and habeas corpus, the
Fifth Circuit also allows a late, direct appeal.6 4 This is permitted
where the defendant has not been apprised of his right to appeal or
has been denied his right to have counsel assist him.65 The rationale
of the court is that the appellant has been denied these rights and that
the 10-day period within which the defendant is required to file notice
of appeal cannot be permitted to run until he has actually been af-
forded them.
66
The District of Columbia Circuit has also developed a well articu-
lated rule for affording review of cases where the defendant has lost
his right to appeal through the acts or omissions of his counsel. The
rule in this circuit appears to be that if the defendant has been de-
prived of his right to appeal by either having never been apprised
of his right to appeal,67 or, having failed to perfect the same,68 the
court will grant relief under section 2255. The procedure for this
relief is that the court in which the petition is filed is to hold a hearing
at which both the defendant and the Government may be represented
by counsel.69 If the court finds the facts to be as claimed by the
defendant, it is to vacate the petitioner's sentence, resentence him
with credit for time served, and restore him "to the status of one
on whom sentence has just been imposed and who has 10 days in
which to institute a direct appeal."
70
The Fifth and District of Columbia Circuits have taken the two
most logical positions on the problem presented by Rodriquez. The
other circuits discussed above also offer relief to the defrauded de-
fendant-relief which is not available under the holdings in the Ninth
Circuit. Whatever the technical form of relief granted by these cir-
cuits, there is manifest an awareness of, and a concern for, the com-
promised position in which a defendant finds himself if he is forced
to allege and prove reversible error in the section 2255 proceeding.
The petitioner seeking relief under section 2255 is usually indigent,
61 Lyles v. United States, 346 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1965).
62 Wainwright v. Simpson, 360 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1966); Camp v. United
States, 352 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1965).
68 See text accompanying note 51 supra.
64 Boruff v. United States, 310 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1962).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 921.
67 Dillane v. United States, 350 F.2d 733 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
68 Carrell v. United States, 335 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
69 Id. at 687.
70 Dillane v. United States, 350 F.2d 732, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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without counsel, and files his petition pro se. Therefore, under the
Dodd decision, the petitioner, without counsel, goes into the section
2255 hearing where it will be determined whether or not he is to
have an appeal. He then must ascertain from the record and prove
the same reversible error which he would have been trying to prove on
direct appeal with the benefit of counsel. The defendant is forced to
suffer this possibly fatal prejudice to his rights because he has been the
victim of a fraud practiced against him by an officer of the court.
Rodriquez, as shown above, is based ultimately upon Dodd. And,
as Dodd is based neither upon precedent nor logic, regardless of its
claim, the Ninth Circuit should not hesitate, at its next opportunity,
to overrule that decision and its successor cases, and formulate a
policy which comports with the spirit of the positions taken by the
District of Columbia and Fifth Circuits.
F.W.M.
